Crisis at Sea: Strengthening Government Regulation to Save Marine Fisheries by Kieves, Nicola




Crisis at Sea: Strengthening Government
Regulation to Save Marine Fisheries
Nicola Kieves
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kieves, Nicola, "Crisis at Sea: Strengthening Government Regulation to Save Marine Fisheries" (2005). Minnesota Law Review. 699.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/699
Note
Crisis at Sea: Strengthening Government
Regulation To Save Marine Fisheries
Nicola Kieves *
Around the world the health of marine fisheries continues
to deteriorate.' In American waters, overfishing occurs in more
than half of all fisheries. 2 Because they are an open-access re-
source "owned by all and owned by none," 3 in the absence of
some restrictions, fisheries are likely to be harvested until deci-
mated.4 Countries continue to close their most profitable fisher-
ies,5 threatening society's health and economic welfare. 6
Socially, overfishing leads to longer working hours, lower
wages, and increased rates of unemployment for fishermen. 7
* J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2002,
Middlebury College. Thank you to Jana Bruder and Ryan Stai for their com-
ments and encouragement throughout the editorial process and to Professor
Jim Chen for his advice and guidance. This Article is dedicated to my family
for their unwavering support these past months and all my life.
1. Jonathan H. Adler, Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine
Fisheries, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 9, 9 (2002).
2. JOSH EAGLE ET AL., TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERY
MANAGEMENT COUNCILS 1 (2003). The Code of Federal Regulations defines
"overfishing" as "whenever a stock or stock complex is subjected to a rate or
level of fishing mortality that jeopardizes the capacity of a stock or stock com-
plex to produce [maximum sustainable yield] on a continuing basis." 50 C.F.R.
§ 600.310(d)(1)(ii) (2004).
3. Christopher J. Carr, Recent Developments in Compliance and En-
forcement for International Fisheries, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 847, 848 (1997).
4. See Adler, supra note 1, at 12.
5. Christopher J. Carr & Harry N. Scheiber, Dealing with a Resource
Crisis: Regulatory Regimes for Managing the World's Marine Fisheries, 21
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 45, 45-46 (2002).
6. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., STUDY "TOWARDS
SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES-ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE MANAGEMENT OF
LIVING MARINE RESOURCES," ("Fisheries are an important contributor to food
security and general economic activity, including employment and trade."), at
http://www.oecd.org/document/62/0,2340,en_2649_33901_2508478 1_1 1_1,00.
html (Oct. 1996) [hereinafter TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES].
7. Oran R. Young, The Political Economy of Fish: The Fishery Conserva-
tion Act of 1976, 10 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 199, 201 (1981); see MARK
1876
CRISIS AT SEA
Meanwhile, the economic impact of fisheries is substantial.
Capture fisheries and aquaculture provided greater than 15%
of the world's total animal protein supply in 2000.8 Trade in
fish products totaled $55.2 billion globally, employing 35 mil-
lion people. 9 In the United States, the commercial fishing in-
dustry generates $25 billion annually.' 0 The recreational fish-
ing industry is even larger. 1
Beyond economic and social harms to society, the loss of
fisheries is a serious biological and ecological concern. Scien-
tists are just beginning to understand the fundamental shifts
that the harvesting of species lead to within an ecosystem.
12
Fishing causes immediate ecological damage by degrading and
altering habitat.13 More importantly, large-scale, long-term
commercial fishing appears to shift species makeup within eco-
systems from a balanced structure to a composition that is less
productive.' 4
The value of healthy marine fisheries is high. They provide
food to cultures around the globe, playing a vital role in many
economies. Additionally, the link between fisheries' health and
the stability of marine ecosystems is becoming clear. What is
not clear is how to best manage these resources. In the United
States, marine fisheries management is governed by legislation
enacted in 1976 designed to, in large part, give U.S. vessels a
large share of the nation's fisheries industry.' 5 The Magnuson-
KuRLANSKY, COD-A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 4
(1997).
8. FOOD & AGRIc. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF WORLD
FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE: PART 1: WORLD REVIEW OF FISHERIES AND
AQUACULTURE 3 (2002), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/OO5/y7300e/
y7300e00.htm.
9. Id. Sixty-five percent of those employed in the global fish trade worked
in marine capture fisheries. Id.
10. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 4-5.
11. Id. at 5.
12. Tony J. Pitcher & Daniel Pauly, Rebuilding Ecosystems, Not Sustain-
ability, as the Proper Goal of Fishery Management, in REINVENTING FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT, 311, 313 (Tony J. Pitcher et al. eds., 1998).
13. Id.
14. See id. at 313-14.
15. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000); see EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 10; Warren G.
Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: First Step
Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REV. 427




Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA)16
attempts to regulate access to a common property resource
without creating any per se private property rights in fish or
fish stocks. 17 Government agencies and regulations have man-
aged this common resource since enactment of the FCMA.
Despite its intentions, regulation under the FCMA has not
led to universally healthy or sustainable marine fisheries.' 8
Problems persist despite the billions of federal dollars spent on
fishery science and improved laws. 19 In an effort to better
achieve sustainable development of fish stocks, the proposed
Fisheries Science and Management Enhancement Act of 2005
(Enhancement Act) aims to amend the FCMA, and address
some of the FMCA's most obvious shortcomings. 20
In the face of evidence that government regulation leads to
poorly managed fisheries, some suggest that privatization of
fishery resources would result in healthier fish stocks.21 Sup-
porters of privatization advocate for private property rights
reasoning that market forces will drive industry participants to
protect the resources on which they rely.22
16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000). The FCMA was reauthorized in 1996
by the Sustainable Fisheries Act. Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
297, 110 Stat. 3559; see OFFICE OF SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, TOWARD REBUILDING AMERICA'S MARINE FISHERIES: ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE STATUS OF U.S. FISHERIES-2001, at 1 (2001),
available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/reports.html.
17. Young, supra note 7, at 203.
18. See Adler, supra note 1, at 10.
19. See EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.
20. Fisheries Science and Management Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R.
1431, 109th Cong. (2005). In this Note, "sustainable development" refers to "a
concept that includes resource conservation as well as the maintenance of the
fishing industry and its production." Carr & Scheiber, supra note 5, at 50 n. 16.
21. See Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust as
an Obstacle to Marine Resource Conservation, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3
(2004); Adler, supra note 1, at 11-12; Alison Rieser, Property Rights and Eco-
system Management in U.S. Fisheries: Contracting for the Commons?, 24
ECOLOGY L.Q. 813 (1997); Donald R. Leal, Community-Run Fisheries: Avoid-
ing the 'Tragedy of the Commons,' in PS-7 PERC POLICY SERIES (Jane S. Shaw
ed., Sept. 1996), available at http://www.perc.org/publications/policyseries/
community-full.php (promoting the use of common property rights in fisher-
ies). See generally Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Air: Four Propositions About
Property Rights and Environmental Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F.
103 (1999) (addressing privatization issues and the environment generally).
22. Cole, supra note 21, at 118. But see Tracy Yandle, Developing a Co-
management Approach in New Zealand Fisheries, in EVOLVING PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES 213, 218 (Donald R. Leal ed., 2005).
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This Note analyzes privatization and government regula-
tion as options to achieve sustainable development of the
United States' marine fisheries. Privatization is examined first
to demonstrate its inefficiencies, costs, and ultimate inability to
lead to healthy fisheries on a national scale. 23 Turning to regu-
lation as the most viable framework to manage fisheries, a cri-
tique of the proposed Enhancement Act indicates that while the
potential amendments are constructive and vital, new federal
government regulation is necessary to sustainably manage
these important resources. 24 Ultimately, fisheries are a public
good belonging to all people. Strong, appropriate legislation
must be enacted to ensure this resource's continued existence.
I. OVERFISHING AND COMPETING INTERESTS IN
MARINE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
The ultimate goal of fisheries management is to contain
fishing effort at a sustainable level. 25 Overcapitalization, how-
ever, often hinders this goal.26 Overcapitalization occurs in fish-
eries where the volume of fishing exceeds that needed to har-
vest optimal levels 27 and the value of fishing equipment and
vessels exceeds any potential value of the catch. 28 Where open
access to a common property exists, such overextended efforts
are inevitable where each participant finds no incentive to limit
their harvest.29
Competition between fishers to gain a greater share of fish
resources exacerbates overcapitalization. 30 This competition
leads to an overbuilding of the industry during good times,
which government subsidies must then support when fisheries
collapse. The result is a global fisheries economy where the cost
of fishing exceeds revenue from harvest.3 1 In 1993, the global
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part IV.B-D.
25. Rik C. Buckworth, World Fisheries Are in Crisis? We Must Respond!,
in REINVENTING FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, supra note 12, at 3, 7.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Franz Thomas Litz, Comment, Harnessing Market Forces in Natural
Resources Management: Lessons from the Surf Clam Fishery, 21 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 335, 338 n.23 (1994).
29. Young, supra note 7, at 200.
30. See Carrie A. Tipton, Note, Protecting Tomorrow's Harvests: Develop-
ing a National System of Individual Transferable Quotas to Conserve Ocean
Resources, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 381, 383 (1995).
31. Buckworth, supra note 25, at 7.
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fishing industry spent $124 billion to catch $70 billion worth of
fish. 32 Subsidies largely filled this $54 billion deficit. 33 Today,
the number of global fishing fleets exceeds the number needed
to achieve sustainable harvest by 250%.34
Though fisheries management attempts to curb fishing ef-
forts to maintain healthy fish stocks, distinct competing inter-
ests make regulation difficult. The interests of industry, sci-
ence, and government all conflict. 35 Fishers, communities, and
the general public all hold a stake in fisheries' health.36 Among
fishers, the interests of large, diversified corporate industry
leaders clash with smaller individually owned vessels; both
compete with simple subsistence fishers.37 Recreational fishers
also claim a stake in fishery health. 38 Within these distinctions,
competition between domestic and foreign interests is appar-
ent.39
Human needs, values, social equity, biology, ecology, eco-
nomics, regulation feasibility, and political acceptability all
play a role in fisheries management.40 Beyond such factors ex-
ists the ethical consideration of nonhuman creatures' right to
life.4 1 Additional ethical considerations, such as whether to pro-
tect current or future generations' interests, are present as
well.42 These many contradictory ideals and perspectives make
32. Carl Safina, The World's Imperiled Fish, SCI. AM., Nov. 1995, at 46,
50.
33. Id. These results came from a 1993 study undertaken for the Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Christopher D. Stone,
Too Many Fishing Boats, Too Few Fish: Can Trade Laws Trim Subsidies and
Restore the Balance in Global Fisheries?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 505, 516-17 (1997).
34. Tim Eichenberg & Mitchell Shapson, The Promise of Johannesburg:
Fisheries and the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 34 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 587, 597 (2004).
35. See Nigel Haggan, Reinventing the Tree: Reflections on the Organic
Growth and Creative Pruning of Fisheries Management Structures, in
REINVENTING FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, supra note 12, at 19, 22.
36. Anthony T. Charles, Beyond the Status Quo: Rethinking Fishery Man-
agement, in REINVENTING FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, supra note 12, at 101,
101.
37. See Haggan, supra note 35, at 24.
38. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 5.
39. See Young, supra note 7, at 205.
40. David B. Preikshot, Reinventing the Formulation of Policy in Future
Fisheries, in REINVENTING FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, supra note 12, at 113,
116.
41. James N. Butler, The Bermuda Fisheries: A Tragedy of the Commons




management difficult. They also indicate that representation of
all stakeholders in any management process is necessary and
vital.
At the most basic level, fishers compete with regulation.
43
Garrett Hardin describes this classic struggle in Tragedy of the
Commons.44 Hardin tells the story of a pasture open to all and
owned by none where each herdsman wishes to maximize his
own gain.45 Consequently, each adds more animals to his herd,
and therein lies the tragedy. Each herdsman treats the system
as one without limit, though it is, in actuality, constrained.
46
Similar competition occurs between fishers in the absence of
regulation with limitless access to the commons leading to its
decimation.
Though a simplification of fisheries, commentators often
describe conservation of marine resources as a quintessential
example of the open-access, common property "tragedy of the
commons" 47 where open access to the oceans invariably leads to
overconsumption and depletion of fish stocks. 48 Ultimately,
overfishing occurs because no individual has an incentive to
limit use. Each is instead motivated to increase their harvest.
49
Two solutions are proposed to alleviate the tragedy of the
commons: privatization and government regulation.50 Both rest
on the assumption that limiting use and access to the commons
is necessary to ensure the preservation of resources. Faced with
a choice between private ownership and regulation, some com-
mentators have recommended that privatization is the more
appropriate choice to solve overfishing problems.51 This asser-
tion rests, in part, on evidence that global legislation has been
43. Charles, supra note 36, at 102.
44. Id.; see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243 (1968).
45. Hardin, supra note 44, at 1244.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 2-3 (1990);
Adler, supra note 1, at 11-12.
48. See H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Re-
source: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954) (using fisheries to illustrate
the commons problem).
49. Adler, supra note 21, at 10; Adler, supra note 1, at 12.
50. Hardin, supra note 44, at 1245, 1247 ("The tragedy of the com-
mons ... is averted by private property" or "mutual coercion, mutually agreed
upon.").
51. See supra note 21 (citing authority).
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unsuccessful in slowing overexploitation of marine resources. 52
Hailing privatization as a panacea, commentators who advo-
cate private property rights do so forcefully and prolifically. 53
In the face of such advocacy, a thorough exploration of privati-
zation warrants significant attention.
II. PRIVATIZATION: INDIVIDUALLY TRANSFERABLE
QUOTAS AND COMMON PROPERTY
The term "privatization" describes the legal conveyance of
property rights from a public entity to a private entity.54 Those
who support private property rights in fisheries management
cite the economic principle that property owners have a higher
incentive to maintain the value of their property than do those
utilizing a public good. 55 The result of privatization, they main-
tain, is a maximization of fishery resource values and the sus-
tainable development of fish stocks. 56 Such an argument has
caused privatization to play a larger role in efforts to remedy
fisheries depletion, implemented through various methods. 57
One of the most common forms of privatization in fisheries
management is "individually transferable quotas" (ITQs). 5s
ITQs are a legal mechanism conferring property rights in a de-
finable fish stock interest to an owner who is then allowed to
catch, land, and market a particular number, or quota, of fish. 59
The owner, either an individual or a firm, fulfills the quota over
a specified time period. 60 In property terms, the hallmarks of a
true ITQ system are indefinite tenure and unlimited transfer-
ability.61 Proponents of ITQs argue that they successfully regu-
52. See Manuel Barange, Ecosystem Science and the Sustainable Man-
agement of Marine Resources: From Rio to Johannesburg, 1 FRONTIERS
ECOLOGY & ENV'T 190, 190 (2003), available at http://tiee.ecoed.net/volv2/
issues/frontier sets/marine/pdflFrontiers-Barange.pdf.
53. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 1, passim.
54. Cole, supra note 21, at 103 n.1.
55. But cf., e.g., Yandle, supra note 22, at 218 (arguing that "increasing
the bundle of property rights (including full ownership rights) does not guar-
antee that the resource will not be depleted").
56. See Adler, supra note 21, at 11. But see infra notes 95-99 and accom-
panying text (arguing that private ownership can lead to extinction of fish
stocks).
57. See Carr & Scheiber, supra note 5, at 48.
58. See id. (discussing the wide use of ITQs).
59. RIGHTS BASED FISHING 1 (Philip A. Neher et al. eds., 1989).
60. Id.
61. See id. at 114.
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late fisheries by preserving economic benefits and conserving
fish stocks for future generations. 62 The driving philosophy be-
hind ITQs is a shift from a "free-for-all" public open-access ap-
proach to a system of individual property rights that are well
defined.6 3
Despite the promises of ITQs, the mobility of many fish
species makes individual private property rights an impracti-
cable scheme. 64 The result is that most observed property
rights in fisheries are collective, common property rights. 65 Un-
der this form of privatization, "fishermen themselves limit en-
try and regulate harvests."66 In this framework, privatization
refers to the collective versus individual "ownership" of rights.67
Where observed, common property systems are imple-
mented with little to no government regulation. 68 Rather,
community norms limit access to fisheries based on traditional
practices.69 These systems work as though government-
sanctioned property rights are in place, with their rules often
operating outside any legal framework.7 0 Such collective ap-
proaches to fisheries management have had some success in
small communities with localized fishing of geographically con-
tained fish stocks.7 1
Privatization is not a mere theoretical model; limited ex-
amples within fisheries management exist. In New Zealand,
ITQs have led to an increase in voluntary efforts to conserve
62. See, e.g., Tipton, supra note 30, at 385, 400-02 (lauding the successful
ITQ programs in New Zealand and Australia).
63. See id. at 397.
64. Jonathan H. Adler, Antitrust Barriers to Cooperative Fishery Man-
agement, in EVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES, supra note
22, at 149, 150.
65. Id.
66. Michael Taylor, The Economics and Politics of Property Rights and
Common Pool Resources, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 633, 645 (1992) (describing
one of a series of case studies found in GARY LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989)).
67. See id.
68. Leal, supra note 21, at 1.
69. Id. at 3.
70. Id. at 4 (noting that "a number of [community-run fisheries] exist
without government approval").
71. See id. passim (describing various community-run fisheries); see also
Adler, supra note 21, at 13 (describing cooperative self-governing institutions);
Anthony Scott, Obstacles to Fishery Self Government, 8 MARINE RESOURCE
ECON. 187, 190 (1993) (describing an Edella Schlager study of forty-two
groups).
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fisheries, 72 and have been an economic success. 73 In Japan,
common property cooperatives are rooted in the common law
and formal law of the feudal era,74 and social banishment re-
sults when an individual's behavior threatens the fishery.75 The
result is a stable catch and financial stability for fishers.76
Maine "harbor gangs" have successfully managed lobster popu-
lations within a long-standing, informal system of property
rights.77 Violations are enforced through self-help measures,
such as the cutting of buoy lines, since no legal authority exists
to keep outsiders from participating. 78 The result is a decrease
in overcapitalization that would otherwise occur. 79
Studies indicating rights-based systems and co-
management are successful conclude, however, that they are
not universal solutions to fisheries problems.80 Fishermen
themselves recognize that ITQs are not for everybody.8' Ulti-
mately, successful examples of private ownership can offer po-
tential solutions to overfishing, but privatization is neither
necessary nor sufficient to reach sustainable fisheries man-
72. See Daniel J. Dudek et al., Environmental Policy for Eastern Europe:
Technology-Based Versus Market-Based Approaches, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
1, 45 (1992).
73. Suzi KERR ET AL., EVALUATING THE NEW ZEALAND INDIVIDUAL
TRANSFERABLE QUOTA MARKET FOR FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 19 (MOTU Eco-
nomic & Public Policy Research Trust, Working Paper No. 2003-02, 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=441061#Paper
Download. The study did not comment on the environmental success or failure
of the system. Id. at 15-17.
74. Leal, supra note 21, at 11.
75. See Kenneth Ruddle & Tomoya Akimichi, Sea Tenure in Japan and
the Southwestern Ryukyus, in A SEA OF SMALL BOATS 337, 365 (Cultural Sur-
vival Report No. 26, John Cordell ed., 1989).
76. Leal, supra note 21, at 12.
77. JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 49 (1988).
78. Id. at 49, 74.
79. See Adler, supra note 1, at 25.
80. See Carr & Scheiber, supra note 5, at 48; TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE
FISHERIES, supra note 6, at 4; see also JOHN R. BEDDINGTON & R. BRUCE
RETTIG, APPROACHES TO THE REGULATION OF FISHING EFFORT 32 (FAO Fish-
eries Technical Paper 243, 1983) (concluding that "[tihe central message is
that there is no single way of regulating fisheries"); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEv., TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES: COUNTRY REPORTS 20
(July 25, 1997) (stating that the use of ITQs in many situations is troubled or
failed), available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1997doc.nsf/LinkTo/ocde-
gd(97) 119 [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS].
81. PEW OCEANS COMM'N, A DIALOGUE ON AMERICA'S FISHERIES 27
(2003), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/pdf/environment~pewoceans_
dialoguejfisheries.pdf.
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agement.8 2 In the face of conflicting criticism and advocacy for
this method of closing access to fisheries, the impacts of priva-
tization must be closely scrutinized to determine whether a
paradigm shift from the current government-based regulatory
framework is wise.
III. PRIVATIZATION IS AN INAPPROPRIATE UNIVERSAL
MARINE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT TOOL
As a legal solution to overfishing, privatization is inade-
quate. It does not guarantee that greater economic efficiency
will lead to sustainable development by solving the open-access
difficulties inherent in fisheries. On the contrary, privatization
may well drive fish stocks to extinction while fishermen maxi-
mize their personal profits. On a most basic level, the ecological
ability of such management to lead to sustainable development
of fish stocks is questionable at best. Political difficulties with
implementing privatization systems compound the economic
uncertainties this management option presents. The additional
social cost of using privatization to manage fisheries militates
against its use.
In addition to feasibility issues, privatization closes man-
agement oversight to many fisheries stakeholders. Because of
privatization's strong emphasis on economic efficiency, many
fisheries stakeholders play little to no role in management ef-
forts. Most notably, the public is no longer represented where
private owners have incentive only to consider their individual
interests. In the face of so many factors and uncertainties, it is
unrealistic to believe privatization is a universal solution to
fisheries management problems.
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL PRIVATIZED FISHERIES
ARE NOT UNIVERSAL
A careful analysis of privatization reveals that only distinct
subsets of fish stocks are sustainably managed. Among those
that privatization can successfully protect are small-ranging,
local, and geographically bound species.83 These characteristics
82. Cole, supra note 21, at 105 ("[C]laims that 'privatization' is a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for optimal environmental protection are inher-
ently implausible, under-supported by economic theory, and under-determined
by the available empirical evidence."). At a minimum, privatization propo-
nents must recognize that "[n]o market can exist for long without underlying
public institutions to support it." OSTROM, supra note 47, at 15.
83. Yandle, supra note 22, at 216 ('With a few exceptions, a small, local,
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are not universal to the many U.S. fisheries with large marine
fish stocks, making the use of privatization throughout U.S.
waters a poor choice to achieve sustainable development.8 4
Another key characteristic of successful privatization
schemes is that single governmental entities are involved, re-
gardless of geographic scale.85 Successful privatization occurs
where management of the system falls to one entity.86 Coordi-
nation difficulties occur when multiple government entities at-
tempt to assign the same property rights to their own citi-
zens.8 7 An immense number of actors are involved in the
protection of U.S. marine fish stocks.8 8 Where a large number
of people are involved in a regulatory scheme, privatization be-
comes impractical and governmental oversight becomes neces-
sary.89
Privatization must be compatible with local conditions and
will therefore not be a successful regulatory regime beyond
relatively small-scale examples.90 This is because large groups
have difficulty creating and enforcing any rule structure. 91
Even if privatization could be formatted to manage large ma-
geographically based [sic] community of users who share a common interest is
the basis for co-management. (This is also true for community manage-
ment.)").
84. Such species include tuna and swordfish. PEW OCEANS COMM'N,
AMERICA'S LIVING OCEANS 40 (2003), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/
pdf/envpew oceans_finaLreport.pdf.
85. Cf. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 80, at 33 (concluding that because
five different governments control fish harvests in Australia's southeast fish-
ery, the resulting ITQ system was less effective).
86. See id. at 27-28 (attributing a portion of the potential success of ITQ
use for the blue fin tuna fishery in Australia to a single species being managed
within one jurisdiction).
87. See E-mail from Rebecca M. Bratspies, Associate Professor, CUNY
School of Law, to Nicola K. Kieves (Oct. 26, 2004, 10:58 EST) (on file with au-
thor).
88. Take, for example, the Pacific Ocean, which is home to the world's
largest tuna harvest. Karen Hopfl, Comment, Go Fish! Individual Transfer-
able Quotas and International Possibilities in the South Pacific, 8 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 137, 156 (1997). Fourteen independent or self-
governing countries, and eight territories of France, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and the United States make up the Pacific Island region where this
harvest takes place. See id.
89. See Scott, supra note 71, at 192 ("For a large group to monitor the
amount taken requires more than cooperation: it requires investment in some
kind of government.").
90. See Yandle, supra note 22, at 216.
91. Elinor Ostrom et al., Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global
Challenges, 284 SCIENCE 278, 281 (1999).
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rine fisheries and to incorporate the many federal and state ju-
risdictions involved in managing U.S. fish stocks, more particu-
lar concerns make privatization impracticable and unreliable.
B. ECONOMICS INDICATE PRIVATIZATION WILL NOT RESULT IN
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF MARINE FISHERIES
Proponents of privatization most frequently cite economic
efficiency and effectiveness as the prime reason to use this
management scheme. 92 However, economists and supporters of
privatization agree that market costs are not always lower than
the cost of government action. 93 While allowing markets and
firms to control the fishing industry may provide more efficient
management in some instances, government regulation leads to
better economic efficiency overall. 94
Private industry has an incentive to deplete a resource and
dissipate its value due to the competitive pursuit of profit when
there is open access to a resource. 95 Where fisheries are already
depleted, economic efficiency dictates that "mining out" the re-
sources is the best decision.96 Rather than rebuilding a fishery,
taking the last available fish becomes most profitable.9 7 Be-
cause a sole owner will maximize the present value of a re-
source, privatization potentially leads to extinction as the best
economic decision.98 Under this scenario, privatization is not an
acceptable management tool.99
92. See Cole, supra note 21, at 117.
93. See Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33, 34
(1968).
94. Economist R.H. Coase explains that this is because, "the government
has powers which might enable it to get some things done at a lower cost than
could a private organisation." R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 17 (1960). But see id. at 18 (noting that "government regulation will
not necessarily give better results than leaving the problem to be solved by the
market or the firm").
95. See STEVEN F. EDWARDS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SOLE
OWNERSHIP OF LIVING MARINE RESOURCES 3 (U.S. Department of Commerce
NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-F/NEC-99 1993).
96. See Haggan, supra note 35, at 24.
97. See id.
98. See Colin W. Clark, Profit Maximization and the Extinction of Animal
Species, 81 J. POL. ECON. 950, 951 (1973). Extinction may result because har-
vesting the last of a species is most profitable, much as mining the last of a
natural resource is most profitable. See id.
99. See Cole, supra note 21, at 123 (stating that "several empirical and
theoretical economic studies suggest that private ownership is not the best so-
lution to every environmental problem").
2005] 1887
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Proponents of ITQs argue that the market-based manage-
ment system creates exclusive rights and transferability with
the hope that market forces will operate to replace manage-
ment's role of allocating scarce resources. 00 Economists there-
fore argue for ITQs as a solution to overcapitalization. 10 1 It is
not clear, however, whether ITQ systems actually result in effi-
cient markets. 10 2 To the contrary, economic inefficiency likely
results because many ITQ systems do not fully embrace trans-
ferability. 103 Others have few participants and transactions. 0 4
Poor initial allocation of quotas and the transition to a new sys-
tem also contribute to economic inefficiencies. 10 5 Where eco-
nomic inefficiencies occur, privatization does not lead to the
sustainable development of marine fisheries. Rather, market
forces lead to overfishing and decimation of fish stocks.
C. ECOLOGICAL CONCERNS MAKE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
OF MARINE FISHERIES UNLIKELY UNDER PRIVATIZATION
Economic incentives and efficiency aside, privatization's ef-
fectiveness in managing fisheries rests in large part on its abil-
ity to lead to sustainable development. The intricacies of fisher-
ies make an ecosystem approach to management essential to
attain this goal.' 06 An ecosystem approach manages not only a
targeted fish species, but all species and factors within the
relevant ecological system. When management addresses only
one target species, complex interactions between species often
lead to unexpected results. 10 7 For example, removing the top
100. See Bonnie J. McCay, Social and Ecological Implications of ITQs: An
Overview, 28 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 3, 4 (1995).
101. Id. at 6.
102. Id.
103. See id. (stating that "transferability is sharply restricted" in some ITQ
systems).
104. Id.
105. See id. The problem of initial allocation has proven especially difficult.
See Hannes H. Gissurarson, Iceland's ITQ System and the Problem of Political
Acceptability, in EVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES, supra
note 22, at 171, 174-76; see also Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343,
350 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding quota allocation was fair and equitable in this in-
stance); Julia E. Gutreuter, Comment, Quota Allocation Methods in the Man-
agement of International Marine Fisheries: Future Implications, 12 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 479, 494 (1999) (discussing problems with allocations of ITQs).
106. See Rieser, supra note 21, at 815-17 (advocating a contractual co-
management model to achieve an ecosystem approach); cf. KURLANSKY, supra
note 7, at 200 ("Marine ecology is complex and tightly interwoven.").
107. See PEW OCEANS COMM'N, supra note 84, at 40.
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predator from a fisheries ecosystem, usually a commercially
important species such as tuna or swordfish, disrupts the many
checks and balances of the ecological system. 108 An ecosystem
approach to management considers these interactions in an at-
tempt to accomplish sustainable development. This approach
becomes even more prudent where there are many commercial
species within a fishery and sustainable development of more
than one fish stock is a goal.10 9
Privatization is ill equipped to adequately implement eco-
system management because of the high degree of coordination
needed and the inherent large-scale concepts involved.1 10 This
is why scientists who study fish stocks support a regional ap-
proach to assessment and management rather than privatiza-
tion."' Coordinated conservation throughout a species range is
central to ecosystem management. 112 While privatization is un-
prepared to successfully supervise ecosystem management, 113
government agencies are equipped and practiced in the large-
scale coordination that ecosystem management calls for, having
already successfully managed some marine fisheries. 114
108. See id. The results of removing such species from an ecosystem in-
clude unpredictable and undesirable outcomes such as disease outbreaks and
suppression of already depleted species. Id.
109. For example, blue and white marlins are threatened with extinction
because they coexist with a tuna species that is commercially targeted. See
Ellen Peel et al., Managing Atlantic Marlin as Bycatch Under ICCAT. The
Fork in the Road: Recovery or Collapse, 54 MARINE & FRESHWATER RES. 575,
575-76 (2003).
110. Cf. PEW OCEANS COMM'N, supra note 84, at 40-41 (describing the se-
vere consequences of overfishing in complex marine ecosystems); Bradley
Karkkainen, Marine Ecosystem Management & A 'Post-Sovereign" Trans-
boundary Governance, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 113 passim (2004) (advocating
collaborative regional governance to manage ecosystems).
111. See Robin Mahon & Hazel A. Oxenford, Precautionary Assessment and
Management of Dolphinfish in the Caribbean, 63 SCIENTIA MARINA 429, 437
(1999).
112. See Carr, supra note 3, at 847-48.
113. See COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 80, at 28 (stating that a wide
range of difficulties were associated with the introduction of an ITQ system in
Australia's multispecies southeast fishery due to the structural and biological
characteristics of the fishery).
114. See NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
IMPLEMENTING THE SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES ACT 2 (2003) (citing twenty-six
successful corrections of overfishing between 1997 and 2002), available at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/docs/SFA-Report-FINAL7_lwith%20cover.pdf; PEW
OCEANS COMM'N, supra note 81, at 23-25 (discussing successful management
of the North Pacific region under the FCMA).
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Conversely, privatization subverts sustainability goals by
making important fisheries regulations difficult to achieve. 115
Examples of affected regulations include those that preserve
environmental values and those designed to protect bycatch
species, fish that are caught incident to the harvest of a target
species. 1 16 ITQ use also promotes "highgrading," the practice of
discarding smaller fish in hopes of later landing larger, more
valuable ones. 117 The promotion of bycatch and highgrading
where ITQs are used makes sustainable.development of even a
single fish stock difficult.
D. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS MAKE SUCCESSFUL
PRIVATIZATION DIFFICULT To ACHIEVE
Political concerns must also be considered before imple-
menting any privatization system, particularly ITQs. 11s Politi-
cal factors include setting total allowable catch, taxation, and
initial allocation, which can be difficult to overcome. 119 In par-
ticular, where ITQs are used, policies that have a negative fi-
nancial impact on quota holders are difficult to implement. 120
Unfortunately, these policy initiatives are often based on sound
scientific theory. 121 This makes management of marine fisher-
ies for sustainable development, which requires flexibility, less
effective. When political battles make implementation of ecol-
115. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., NEW ZEALAND CASE STUDY:
INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE
QUOTAS (ITQS) 6, at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/27/2349219.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 5, 2005).
116. See id. at 7 ("[I]n general terms, the introduction of ITQs has coincided
with a marked increase in the level of industry resistance to any government
actions which are seen as commercially detrimental."). For instance, ITQ use
in Alaska allowed each vessel numerous quota holders, which caused omis-
sions and discrepancies in landing data leading to difficulties in determining
whom to prosecute for violations of fishery laws, including possession of pro-
hibited species or undersized fish. Alaska v. Dupier, 74 P.3d 922, 927 (Alaska
Ct. App. 2003).
117. See Donald R. Leal, Fencing the Fishery: A Primer on Rights-Based
Fishing, in EVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 22,
at 1, 11; see also RIGHTS BASED FISHING, supra note 59, at 115. This problem
is even greater than that of bycatch in some areas. Gissurarson, supra note
105, at 176 (discussing the problems of bycatch and high grading in Icelandic
fisheries).
118. Leal, supra note 117, at 12-14.
119. Id.
120. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 115, at 7.
121. Cf. id. (describing the difficulties in introducing regulation to protect
bycatch species and preserve environmental values in New Zealand fisheries).
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ogically necessary changes difficult, ITQs are no longer a useful
management tool for fisheries.
Beyond economic, ecological, and political concerns, an
analysis of privatization must address social costs. 1
22 Oppo-
nents argue that privatization will lead to a consolidation of
fishing rights in the hands of a wealthy few who have the
means necessary to purchase large amounts of quotas. 123 For
many, the loss of a fishing lifestyle is a sad reality. For exam-
ple, third generation fisherman Jim Lovgren emphatically be-
lieves fisheries management ignores economic impacts on
communities, 124 noting, "It's a sad statement, but I have three
boys and I don't want any of them on a boat."125 This historic
way of life and the importance of maintaining community ties
to fishing must play a role in judging privatization.
In the face of uncertain economics, ecological concerns, and
negative political and social implications, privatization is an
inadequate management tool for marine fisheries. Instead, gov-
ernmental regulation and oversight must be used in an effort to
avoid the tragedy of the commons. 26
IV. THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT
A. INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Historically, the doctrine of mare liberum governed coastal
waters and held that each nation's territorial seas reached
three nautical miles from shore. 127 Mare liberum evolved into
122. A thorough discussion of the social impacts of privatization is outside
the scope of this Note. The discussion included here merely highlights the is-
sue's existence and is not meant as a comprehensive analysis.
123. See, e.g., COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 80, at 27 (discussing the "con-
centration of quota ownership" that resulted from the use of ITQs in Austra-
lia).
124. See PEW OCEANS COMM'N, supra note 81, at 8-9.
125. Id. Though Mr. Lovgren spoke not of ITQs particularly, his words
resonate with those concerned about the social impacts of poorly managed
fisheries.
126. Undeniably, challenges lie ahead for government regulation. See Leal,
supra note 117, at 4-6. Regardless, it is imperative that some system close the
open-access commons of fisheries to preserve this resource. With privatization
offering at best a questionable option to structuring access to fisheries, gov-
ernment regulation needs to succeed.
127. See PETER WEBER, ABANDONED SEAS: REVERSING THE DECLINE OF
THE OCEANS 39 (Worldwatch Paper No. 116, 1993).
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the Law of the Sea under a number of United Nations-
mediated treaties expanding each nation's sovereign control to
200 nautical miles. 128 Within these areas, known as Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZs),129 coastal countries exercise exclusive
rights to govern natural resources. 130
As nations began to assert their regulatory rights granted
under the Law of the Sea,131 the United States passed the Fish-
ery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA). 132 Now
known as the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act, 133 the 1976 legislation declared that a fishery
conservation zone extended to 200 nautical miles off U.S.
shores. 34 In addition to codifying this new rule of international
law, the FCMA was significant because it established compre-
hensive management of U.S. fisheries for the first time. 135
Legislative records indicate that Congress passed the
FCMA primarily to decrease the number of foreign fishing ves-
sels in the newly declared fishery conservation zone. 136 When
signing H.R. 200 into law as the Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act, President Gerald Ford stated that foreign
overfishing in U.S. coastal waters must be stopped, but made
no mention of the impact of domestic industries on fisheries.137
128. See WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES
1 (1994).
129. See WEBER, supra note 127, at 40. This expansion came from negotia-
tions during a series of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
Id.
130. Tipton, supra note 30, at 386-87.
131. See WEBER, supra note 127, at 40.
132. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000)).
133. Congress has amended the FCMA several times since passage and has
renamed the Act twice. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at iv. References to "the
FCMA" throughout this Note refer to what is today known as the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883
(2000).
134. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 8. Today, the term EEZ refers to these
fishery conservation zones. Id.
135. Magnuson, supra note 15, at 427.
136. See EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 3. Rather than focusing on conser-
vation aspects of the Act, "[m]ost of the congressional debate centered on the
legality and wisdom of establishing unilaterally a 200-mile [fishery conserva-
tion zone]." Id. at 10. This was despite the fact that sixteen species of fish were
deemed overfished when the Act passed; most of that overfishing was blamed
on foreign fishing efforts. Magnuson, supra note 15, at 432.
137. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE & NATL OCEAN POLICY
STUDY, 94TH CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION
AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, at 34 (Comm. Print 1976).
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In his remarks to the Senate during debate on the bill, Senator
Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) also made a point of emphasizing
that as fish stocks continued to be depleted, the number of for-
eign fishing vessels in American waters increased without
mentioning any effect of, or on, domestic vessels. 138
The distinctions drawn between foreign and domestic fish-
ermen were quickly noticed after the Act was established. 139
Detailed provisions of the legislation focused on economic pro-
tection rather than conservation objectives. 140 To date, rules
and regulations promulgated under the FCMA do the same.
141
The conservation framework of the FCMA established
eight regional fishery management councils to govern fisheries
in U.S. waters.142 Each council develops management plans and
supporting regulations for fisheries needing conservation.
143
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) exercises over-
sight authority over each council and enforces fishery manage-
ment plans. 144 The FCMA requires the NMFS to implement ac-
tions to rebuild overfished stocks and to prevent further
overfishing. 145 Additionally, the FCMA requires the United
States to support and encourage the implementation of all in-
ternational agreements regarding highly migratory species. 146
138. Id. at 229.
139. Young, supra note 7, at 205 ("[I]t is hard to avoid the conclusion that
the FCMA establishes two rather different sets of governing arrangements,
one for foreign fishermen and the other for domestic fishermen.").
140. See id.
141. The Code of Federal Regulations sets forth stricter requirements for
foreign fishing vessels than for domestic vessels. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 600.5-.1204
(2004). Compare id. § 600.503(a)(3) (requiring vessel identifications of at least
one meter in height for foreign vessels over twenty meters in length), with id.
§ 622.6(a)(ii)(C) (requiring identifications of only eighteen inches for compara-
ble domestic vessels).
142. 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (2000). These include: the North Pacific Council,
Western Pacific Council, Pacific Council, Gulf Council, Caribbean Council,
South Atlantic Council, Mid-Atlantic Council, and New England Council. Id.
143. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1.
144. Id. at 11. Though the NMFS has authority to overrule each council, in
practice this seldom happens. Id. at 1.
145. Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions; Fisheries off West Coast States
and in the Western Pacific; Pacific Coast Groundfish Fishery; Biennial Specifi-
cations and Management Measures, 69 Fed. Reg. 56,550, 56,550 (Sept. 21,
2004) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 C.F.R. pt. 660).
146. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2); see also id. § 1801(b)(4). Highly migratory spe-
cies are those that "migrate in and out of the high seas." Karen L. Smith,
Highly Migratory Fish Species: Can International and Domestic Law Save the
North Atlantic Swordfish?, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 5, 6 (1999). The FCMA
grants additional authority to create, prepare, and update management plans
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Each council is composed of several "obligatory" appointed
members 147 and a number of "at-large" appointed members. 48
The primary objective of each council is to prepare a fishery
management plan for every fishery in its district. 149 In creating
these management plans, the councils must follow ten national
standards as guidelines. 1 0 The councils receive advice and sup-
port from advisory groups, though each council ultimately
makes management decisions after analyzing the information
produced by the groups. 15 1
Decades ago, scholar Oran Young claimed that restricting
the common property of marine fisheries was the best conceiv-
able management framework. 152 Young recognized that gov-
ernment regulation of natural resources was feasible, and fish-
eries management under the FCMA was proof of that
feasibility. 153 His announcement that government regulation
would lead to the most satisfactory result has proven correct. 5 4
Under the FCMA, overfishing in U.S. waters has been cor-
rected twenty-six times. 55
Despite this success, the current legislatively mandated
framework for governmental regulation of fisheries raises some
for highly migratory species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1854(g).
147. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12.
148. Id. at 13.
149. Id.
150. Id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1851 (2000). The Code of Federal Regulations
articulates "guidelines, based on the national standards, to assist in the devel-
opment and review of [fishery management plans]." 50 C.F.R. § 600.305(a)(1)
(2004); see also id. §§ 600.310-.355 (providing more detailed guidelines for
each national standard set forth in 16 U.S.C. § 1851).
151. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 16. Each council appoints the members
of its advisory committees. Id. As with council membership, it is important to
note that the fishing industry likewise dominates all nonscientific advisory
groups. Id.
152. See Young, supra note 7, at 263-64.
153. Id. at 264.
154. Government regulations' include restrictions on where fishing is al-
lowed, when fishing is allowed, types of gear, vessel catch per fishing trip, size
and power of fishing vessels, number of fishing trips, and catch characteristics
(including size restrictions). Leal, supra note 117, at 4.
155. See NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra
note 114, at 2. The North Pacific region is particularly successful in promoting
sustainable development of its fisheries. See EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 19
boxes 6, 24, 26; PEW OCEANS COMM'N, supra note 81, at 23 ("'[I]t is the best
managed fishery in the United States .... ' (quoting a commercial fisherman,
who is the current president of the Pacific Seafood Processors Association and
chief executive officer of Westward Seafoods)).
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concerns. 156 Critiques of statutorily mandated management of
fisheries under the FCMA began with the Act's passage.
157
Even with some success under the FCMA, overfishing of ma-
rine fish stocks continues. 158 Thus, while government regula-
tion is the optimal tool to manage marine fisheries, the current
regulatory regime of the FCMA will not do.
B. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE FCMA
When it passed the FCMA, Congress considered few of the
advantages and disadvantages of the regional council sys-
tem. 159 As a result, the framework of the FCMA has failed to
maintain sustainable coastal fisheries throughout U.S. wa-
ters.16 0 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), the NMFS's supervisory agency, concluded that the
regional councils established by the Act are ineffective man-
agement tools. 161 Their failure rests in part with one of the
chief concerns regarding fisheries management in the United
States: the influence of special interests on the eight manage-
ment councils. 16 2
156. See generally, e.g., EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2 (evaluating and critiqu-
ing the FCMA).
157. See, e.g., Eugene R. Fidell, Enforcement of the Fishery Conservation
and Management Act of 1976: The Policeman's Lot, 52 WASH. L. REV. 513
(1977) (discussing the enforceability of the FCMA).
158. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note
114, at 3.
159. See EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 10 ("Management issues, and in
particular the structure and makeup of the new regional councils, received
scant congressional attention or thought." (citing SENATE COMM. ON
COMMERCE & NAT'L OCEAN POLICY STUDY, 94TH CONG., A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976
(Comm. Print 1976))).
160. See David L. Allison, Problems with U.S. Ocean Governance and Insti-
tutional Structures: The Impact on Waters, Fish, and Fisheries in the U.S. Ex-
clusive Economic Zone, in MANAGING MARINE FISHERIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 25, 25 (Pew Oceans Comm'n ed., 2002) ("The Magnuson-Stevens Fish-
ery Management and Conservation [sic] Act is a failed experiment that has led
to the destruction of U.S. coastal fisheries."), available at http://www.pew
trusts.com/pdf/environment_pewoceansmanaging-fisheries.pdf.
161. See EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 95, at 17 (noting that "[i]t may be
necessary to dissolve the regional council system, even if fish resources remain
owned by the state").
162. See id. at 15 ("Rather than pursue economic efficiency, which benefits
regional fishermen, seafood producers, and consumers, the regional councils
have attended to the short-term financial and distributive impacts of their de-
cisions.").
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Appointed members of the management councils are nota-
bly exempt from federal conflict-of-interest laws. 163 This is sig-
nificant because the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA),164 which governs federal advisory committees 165 and
requires that they incorporate differing viewpoints, 66 was
passed in part to create balanced advisory committees so that
industry special interests could be minimized. 16 7 In fisheries
management, industry domination of council membership be-
came a problem when the FCMA was first implemented; in
1976, industry representation already controlled the makeup of
each council. 68 As of 2003, at least 80% of council appointees
were representatives of the fishing industry.16 9 Perhaps most
concerning, consumers and the general public are mentioned
nowhere in the FCMA, except in a provision regarding the
minimization of management costs. 170
With councils responsible for both allocation and conserva-
tion decisions, conflicting management is inevitable as these
two objectives often require incompatible management strate-
gies. 17 1 In an industry and resource conservation field where so
many competing interests are at stake, the dominance of coun-
cils by only one of those interests compromises effective, effi-
cient, and equitable management of marine fisheries.
163. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 29; Committee Resources Democratic
Staff, Fisheries Management Reform Act of 2004 Fact Sheet (2004) [hereinaf-
ter Reform Act Fact Sheet] (on file with author).
164. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2000).
165. Id. § 4.
166. Id. § 5(b)(2); see also EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 23, 29 (discussing
the passage of the FACA and its relation to fishery management councils).
167. See H.R. REP. No. 92-1017, at 6 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3491, 3496 ("[The] lack of balanced representation of different points of view
and the heavy representation of parties whose private interests could influ-
ence their recommendations would be prohibited by the [Act].").
168. See Giulio Pontecorvo, Fishery Management and the General Welfare:
Implications of the New Structure, 52 WASH. L. REV. 641, 652 tbl.3, 653 (1977)
(showing that industry representation among council appointees ranged from
63-100%).
169. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 5.
170. Francis T. Christy, Jr., The Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 1976: Management Objectives and the Distribution of Benefits and Costs,
52 WASH. L. REV. 657, 661 (1977).
171. See EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 21-22 (discussing the negative im-
pact of allocation decisions on conservation measures). Scholars have criticized
the granting to one body of both conservation and allocation responsibility by
the FCMA since its inception. See, e.g., Pontecorvo, supra note 168, at 654




Compounding the underlying tension between conservation
and allocation decisions are council voting rules. Council mem-
bers may vote even if they have a financial interest in a mat-
ter.172 One study found that there have been only two formal
recusals filed by council members since 1997.173 Respondents to
a survey indicated informal recusals are also infrequent.
174
Council members will generally justify their votes despite exist-
ing financial interests. 175 The result has been increases in catch
quotas that are contrary to scientific recommendations and
lead to unsustainable harvests. 176
The FCMA is the only national legal fisheries management
framework that gives the fishing industry a high level of au-
thority to make large-scale decisions. 177 Other nations' man-
agement schemes have generally declined to use the council
system. 178 Rather, they grant final decision-making authority
to government agencies, with fishermen playing only an advi-
sory role. 179 Even within our own national legislative history,
the FCMA is unique in its structure of placing the regional
councils as a buffer between state and federal authorities.
8 0
The separation of state and federal authorities by the re-
gional councils highlights the poor administrative structure
under which the FCMA functions. Though the NMFS is tasked
with implementing management plans generated by the coun-
172. See 50 C.F.R. § 600.235(c) (2004) (permitting a voter to vote but limit-
ing the percentage of interest a voter may have and still qualify to vote); see
also EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 29.
173. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 29. Thousands of management deci-
sions occurred during the same time period. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Reform Act Fact Sheet, supra note 163; see also Fisheries Man-
agement Reform Act of 2004, H.R. 4706, 108th Cong. §§ 5, 6(b) (2004) (provid-
ing for the establishment of regional science and technical teams to make rec-
ommendations to the secretary of commerce and requiring the secretary to
provide the councils certain conservation and management provisions, based
on the newly created teams' recommendations, for incorporation in fishery
management plans, plan amendments, or annual specifications).
177. See EAGLE ETAL., supra note 2, at 11 box 2.
178. See id. Other countries emulating the FCMA management structure
have seen poor results. Id. Australia passed similar legislation in 1991. E.g. id.
In 1992, 25% of known stocks were classified as overfished; by 2003, that
number had increased to 50%. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Magnuson, supra note 15, at 436; Young, supra note 7, at 215.
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cils,181 at least seven federal agencies or their subdivisions con-
tribute to marine resources management under U.S. law.18 2
In addition to poor structuring of fisheries management,
the FCMA has not provided adequate scientific guidance to
fishery management plans.183 In too many cases, scientific in-
put is only a recommendation and not a binding starting point
for framing management plans.18 4 Lastly, the FCMA does not
effectively enable enforcement. 8 5 The FMCA grants "the Secre-
tary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating"
responsibility for enforcing the Act.18 6 The secretary of com-
merce is also responsible for the Act's enforcement. 8 7 The lack
of a sufficient enforcement structure 88 as well as particular
sanctions for specific violations makes application of the FCMA
regulations difficult.
These shortcomings of the FCMA must be addressed to al-
low successful government regulation of U.S. fisheries. Fortu-
nately, an opportunity exists with House Bill 1431, the pro-
posed Fisheries Science and Management Enhancement Act of
2005.189
/
C. PROPOSED REFORM OF THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION ACT
1. Strengths of the Proposed Fisheries Management Reform
On March 17, 2005, Representative Nick J. Rahall (D-W.
Va.) introduced the Fisheries Science and Management En-
hancement Act of 2005 (Enhancement Act). 190 Aimed to amend
181. EAGLE ETAL., supra note 2, at 11.
182. Burr Heneman, Federal Fishery Laws: New Model Needed to Sustain
Fisheries and Ecosystems, in MANAGING MARINE FISHERIES IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 160, at 1.
183. See EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 16.
184. Id.
185. See U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 291 (2004) ("[I]ncreasing pressures on agencies hinder effective
environment enforcement and delay the evolution of fishery management
plans toward a more ecosystem-based approach."), available at http://ocean
commission.gov/documents/full color_rpt/000_oceanfull-report.pdf.
186. 16 U.S.C. § 1861(a) (2000).
187. Id.
188. See U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 185, at 291-92.
189. Fisheries Science and Management Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R.




the FCMA, the Enhancement Act addresses some of the worst
shortcomings of the current legislation. 191 The proposed amend-
ments were referred to the House Committee on Resources on
March 17, 2005 and to the Subcommittee on Fisheries and
Oceans on March 24, 2005.192
On June 24, 2004, Representative Rahall introduced simi-
lar legislation as H.R. 4706, the Fisheries Management Reform
Act of 2004 (Reform Act).193 The Reform Act was not passed,
which led to 2005's Enhancement Act. While many important
features of the Reform Act are embodied in the Enhancement
Act, there are distinguishable differences between these two
pieces of legislation.
The proposed Enhancement Act seeks first to diversify in-
terests represented on the regional councils. 194 By providing
that there must be appointments of "'representatives of the
public interest.., who [do not] derive any of their annual in-
come from commercial or recreational fishing,"'195 the En-
hancement Act would facilitate more balanced council member-
ship.
Currently, the overwhelming majority of decision makers
on the councils have a stake in the fishing industry.196 No other
public trust resource in the United States is managed based on
the decisions of the industry being regulated. 197 Because eco-
nomics dictates the maximization of present value and discount
of future revenues, the potential for biased management plans
exists. 98 By amending the FCMA, the Enhancement Act at-
tempts to move past simple economic motivations for decision
making by specifically encouraging increased consideration of
public interest factors. 199 The proposed amendments to the
FCMA also add a training requirement for all council mem-
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. Fisheries Management Reform Act of 2004, H.R. 4706, 108th Cong.
(2004).
194. 150 CONG. REC. E1248-49 (daily ed. June 25, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Rahall).
195. H.R. 1431, § 2(a)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
196. See EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 5.
197. 150 CONG. REC. E1248 (daily ed. June 25, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Rahall).
198. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text (arguing that private
ownership can lead to extinction of fish stocks).
199. See H.R. 1431; 150 CONG. REC. E1248 (daily ed. June 25, 2004)
(statement of Rep. Rahall).
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bers. 200 Legislators hope these reforms will improve council
members' ability to make appropriate management decisions
when faced with "complex information, competing interests,
and legal and regulatory requirements."201
The Enhancement Act would also strengthen the conflict-
of-interest provisions of the FCMA.202 Amending the FCMA as
proposed would ensure that council members with financial in-
terests requiring disclosure could not vote. 203 Currently, voting
members must recuse themselves only where they have a 10%
or greater interest of the total harvest in question, or a greater
than 10% interest in the processing or marketing of the total
harvest of the fishery in question.204 Though disqualified mem-
bers cannot vote, they may participate in deliberations. 205 Cou-
pled with the proposed amendments' attempt to balance the
management interests of competing fisheries, these voting pro-
visions work towards a less biased management decision-
making process.
Finally, the proposed Enhancement Act attempts to ensure
science-based management of marine fisheries. 206 The proposed
FCMA amendments would mandate an opportunity for public
input and peer review of management plans by qualified inde-
pendent scientists. 207 This is important because management
plans gain validity when they are a product of public debate
rather than a subject of it.208 The Enhancement Act requires
200. H.R. 1431, § 2(b). Training will cover: "'(i) fishery science and basic
fish stock assessment; (ii) basic instruction in ecological principles; (iii) social
science and fishery economics; (iv) the requirements of this Act ... and other
relevant statutes or regulations; (v) conflict of interest policies that apply to
council members; and (vi) the public process for developing fishery manage-
ment plans."' Id. The same proposal, with minor modifications was proposed
in the Reform Act in 2004. Fisheries Management Reform Act of 2004, H.R.
4706, 108th Cong. § 3(e) (2004). Notably, the Reform Act required that all
council members receive this training while the Enhancement Act simply re-
quires that new members receive the training. Compare H.R. 1431, §
3(b)(2)(A), with H.R. 4706, § 3(e).
201. Reform Act Fact Sheet, supra note 163.
202. H.R. 1431, § 3(d).
203. -Id. The Reform Act additionally provided that individuals not allowed
to vote could not participate in council deliberations related to the decision.
H.R. 4706, § 4(b).
204. 50 C.F.R. § 600.235(c) (2004).
205. Id. § 600.235(e).
206. H.R. 1431, §§ 3, 5-6.
207. H.R. 1431, § 5; see also 150 CONG. REC. E1248-49 (daily ed. June 25,
2004) (statement of Rep. Rahall).
208. See Christine Willmore, Codes of Practice: Communicating Between
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each council to "establish and maintain a science and statistical
committee to assist the Council in the development, collection,
and evaluation of such statistical, biological, economic, social,
and other scientific information as is relevant to the Council's
development and amendment of any fishery management
plan." 209 These science and statistical committees in turn must
establish a fishery and marine science subcommittee. 210 The
subcommittees would communicate bycatch limits, necessary
habitats, and area protections, along with specific requirements
needed to protect species listed under section 4 of the Endan-
gered Species Act.211
While the proposed Enhancement Act is not comprehensive
legislation, it addresses the appointment of a more balanced
council, and it also provides for public input into the manage-
ment process.212 Currently under the FCMA, competing inter-
ests are not equitably represented.213 The Enhancement Act
addresses this issue to make councils more balanced. It tight-
ens conflict-of-interest and voting recusal standards and
strengthens the scientific basis for management plans. 214 If
provisions such as these are enacted into law, they will repre-
sent the beginning of a potentially promising future for success-
ful government regulation of marine fisheries in the United
States.
2. Enhancement Act Weaknesses
As currently written, the FCMA creates a regulatory
scheme that fishermen and scholars agree does not adequately
protect America's marine fish stocks.215 While the proposed
Enhancement Act promises many hopeful improvements to the
FCMA, it still falls short of moving closer to sustainable devel-
opment of marine fisheries. As Enhancement Act sponsor Rep-
Science and Law, in SCIENCE IN COURT 37, 47 (Michael Freeman & Helen
Reece eds., 1998).
209. H.R. 1431, § 3(a).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See id. § 5.
213. See EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 5 (noting that over 80% of the citi-
zens who are appointed to the councils represent the fishing industry).
214. See H.R. 1431, §§ 2, 3, 5, 6.
215. See PEW OCEANS COMM'N, supra note 81, passim (reporting fishermen
feedback on the state of the fishing industry and how to achieve sustainable
management); see, e.g., Adler, supra note 21, at 5-8 (discussing the failures of
fisheries management despite decades of government regulation).
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resentative Rahall stated when he first introduced the legisla-
tion as the Reform Act in 2004, "This [legislation] addresses
just one of many problems plaguing ocean resource manage-
ment."2 1
6
Most notably, the Enhancement Act fails to separate con-
servation and allocation decisions.217 When introduced as H.R.
4706, the Reform Act attempted to begin such separation in
hopes of leading to management plans better able to produce
sustainable development in fisheries 218 by decreasing pressure
to relax conservation standards where industry representatives
dominate councils and have a clear financial stake in keeping
allocation levels high.219 Such separation is imperative. As a re-
cent study showed, "[t]he most important reform [to the struc-
ture of the management council system] would be to separate
conservation and allocation decisions."220
The proposed amendments to the FCMA begin to provide
for a sounder science-based approach to management. Far
more, however, can and must be done to achieve sustainable
marine fisheries throughout U.S. ocean territories. Most nota-
ble is that the proposed Enhancement Act does not mandate an
ecosystem approach to management. Scientific consensus
shows that such an approach is necessary and most effective in
achieving sustainable development goals in fisheries. 221
The proposed Enhancement Act still leaves final decisions
regarding ecologically safe levels of exploitation and habitat
protection measures to an appointed political figure, the secre-
tary of commerce, with no proposal to incorporate binding sci-
entific opinion into regulation oversight. 222 Most political fig-
ures have little to no scientific training, and time has proven
that politics often overshadows science.223 This leaves open the
216. 150 CONG. REC. E1249 (daily ed. June 25, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Rahall).
217. See H.R. 1431.
218. See Reform Act Fact Sheet, supra note 163.
219. 150 CONG. REC. E1248-49 (daily ed. June 25, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Rahall) (stating that "[b]y allowing scientists to recommend appropriate catch
limits and the Councils to determine how that catch should be allocated, this
bill would remove council members from that untenable position of choosing
between the health of the resources and catching enough fish to pay their
health insurance").
220. See EAGLE ETAL., supra note 2, at 37.
221. U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 185, at 274.
222. H.R. 1431, §§ 3, 5-6.
223. Donald R. Leal, Fueling the Race to the Fish, in GOVERNMENT VS.
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potential for political matters to complicate, influence, and un-
dermine the scientific basis underlying management strategies
necessary to protect marine fisheries.
Under the Enhancement Act, there is also a conspicuous
lack of any sanctions for violations of the proposed new provi-
sions. 224 Even if such sanctions were present, they would likely
be ineffective as the Enhancement Act does not address en-
forcement. The FCMA provides for both civil and criminal pen-
alties in the event of violation.225 However, most enforcement
authority now rests in instances where an individual resists or
interferes with an enforcement activity. 22 6 What little enforce-
ment effort is written into the FCMA focuses on foreign, rather
than domestic, fishermen.227 The Enhancement Act lacks any
provisions addressing this weakness. 228
With the apparent failure of the FCMA's legislative frame-
work to protect U.S. marine fisheries, and privatization's in-
ability to provide a viable alternative to government regulation,
a paradigm shift to new legislation must be seriously enter-
tained.229
V. NEW COMPREHENSIVE, CONSERVATION-FOCUSED
LEGISLATION IS NEEDED TO PROTECT UNITED STATES
MARINE FISHERIES
Though admittedly ambitious, the solution to marine fish-
eries regulatory difficulties lies in drafting new comprehensive,
fully detailed legislation that adequately addresses all fisheries
management problems. As legislators themselves admit,
amendments to the FCMA tend to address only one of the host
of problems plaguing the legal management framework.230 The
ENVIRONMENT 39, 43 (Donald R. Leal & Roger E. Meiners eds., 2002).
224. Prohibited acts under the FCMA are addressed in 16 U.S.C. § 1857(2000).
225. Id. §§ 1859-1860.
226. See id. § 1861; see also Young, supra note 7, at 217.
227. Young, supra note 7, at 208.
228. See Fisheries Science and Management Enhancement Act of 2005,
H.R. 1431, 109th Cong. (2005).
229. This failure is demonstrated by difference between the Enhancement
Act and the Reform Act. Compare H.R. 1431, with Fisheries Management Re-
form Act of 2004, H.R. 4706, 108th Cong. (2004). Many features of the Reform
Act that went to the heart of the FCMA's shortcomings are missing or watered
down in the Enhancement Act, such as a separation between conservation and
allocation decisions. Compare H.R. 1431, with H.R. 4706, § 5.
230. See 150 CONG. REC. E1249 (daily ed. June 25, 2004) (statement of
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proposed Enhancement Act follows this tradition and aims only
to patch one of the FCMA's deficiencies. 231 Until Congress en-
acts comprehensive marine fisheries legislation, it will have
failed to undertake the steps necessary to lead to sustainable
development of these important resources.
To best achieve successful government regulation of ma-
rine fisheries, new legislation must be conservation driven.
Within a conservation framework, administrative structures
must be reworked to facilitate conservation goals. Optimally,
the current FCMA council system would be eliminated to allow
conservation and allocation decisions to be made separately,
with management taking an ecosystem approach. Additionally,
strong sanctions and enforcement mechanisms for any violation
of fisheries law would be specified with particularity. By ad-
dressing the motivation for marine fisheries legislation, the
structure of such regulation, and the particularities of execut-
ing fisheries management, new comprehensive fisheries law
would be best able to develop sustainable fish stocks.
A. LEGISLATION MUST ELIMINATE PROTECTIONIST
MOTIVATIONS FOR FISHERIES LAW AND CREATE A MORE
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
Paramount to any new marine fisheries legislation is a
separation of protectionism and conservation. Though recent
amendments to the FCMA focus on the conservation aspects of
the legislation,23 2 the Act was born out of the protectionist ten-
dencies of Congress in the mid-1970s. 233 The FCMA still sets as
one of its purposes the goal "to promote domestic commercial
and recreational fishing."234 One of its main findings remains
that "[t]he activities of massive foreign fishing fleets in waters
adjacent to such coastal areas have contributed to such dam-
Rep. Rahall).
231. See id. (addressing Representative Rahall's FCMA amendments as
first proposed in 2004).
232. See Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. -3559;
H.R. 4706.
233. See EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 10; Young, supra note 7, at 208
("[]n actuality, protectionist concerns are more deeply embedded in the FCMA
regime than the desire to ensure the conservation of fish stocks."). See gener-
ally STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE & NAT'L OCEAN POLICY STUDY,
94TH CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976 (Comm. Print 1976).
234. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(3) (2000) (emphasis added).
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age, interfered with domestic fishing efforts, and caused de-
struction of the fishing gear of United States fishermen."235
The danger- in leaving protectionism and conservation ob-
jectives together is that protectionist concerns will underlay or
overshadow conservation efforts.236 The United States has pre-
viously passed specific conservation-based legislation.237 If the
nation's public fisheries are to remain viable for generations to
come, they symbolically and substantively require designated
federal legislation that aims solely at conserving these re-
sources.
Also vital to achieving effective federal marine fisheries
management is a restructuring of the current administrative
framework. 238 Implementation of the FCMA is now overseen by
the NMFS, a department of NOAA, which is situated within
the Department of Commerce (DOC).239 NOAA came under the
purview of the DOC primarily for political, rather than merito-
rious, reasons.240 Between 1971 and 1999, twenty-three failed
attempts were made to resituate NOAA under a more appro-
priate authority.241 Today the nation faces environmental crises
ranging from marine fisheries management, to energy supply,
to endangered species preservation. The time is ripe to reorgan-
ize federal environmental administrative agencies to best facili-
tate management of our public resources rather than to pander
to political interests. 242
235. Id. § 1801(a)(3) (emphasis added).
236. See Young, supra note 7, at 207 ("There is a marked differ-
ence ... between setting up a regime to conserve fish stocks in the sense of
avoiding severe biological depletions and promulgating a set of provisions
aimed at protecting domestic fishermen, ensuring them guaranteed access to
the fisheries .... ).
237. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544
(2000).
238. See U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 185, at 108 (stating
that reorganization of federal agencies responsible for ocean and coastal ac-
tivities would "improve government performance, reduce unnecessary over-
laps, [and] facilitate local, state, and regional interactions with the federal
government").
239. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1, 10.
240. U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 185, at 109.
241. Id. at 109 fig.7.1.
242. This Note envisions a restructuring whereby agencies such as the
EPA, NIH, and NOAA would be placed under one department. A logical exist-
ing choice is The Department of Interior (DOI), whose mission "is to protect
the nation's treasures for future generations, provide access to the nation's
natural and cultural heritage, provide wise stewardship of energy and mineral
resources, foster sound use of land and water resources, and conserve and pro-
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Part of the FCMA's failure rests on the fact that it is one of
seven narrowly focused laws relevant to fisheries manage-
ment.243 Seven federal agencies areinvolved in managing ma-
rine resources in U.S. waters. 244 While the Enhancement Act
addresses just one in this patchwork of laws, comprehensive
marine fisheries legislation should consolidate oversight and
management responsibility within a single government entity.
This would contribute to a clear mission and management di-
rection, enabling sustainable- fisheries development. 245
B. CONSERVATION AND ALLOCATION DECISION MAKING MUST
BE SEPARATED
As noted earlier, one of the major faults of the FCMA is its
council framework. Though the proposed Enhancement Act fo-
cuses on this and attempts to put into place amendments that
remove some conflict-of-interest issues, it does not go far
enough to remedy the defect. As written, the FCMA grants
much power to the regional councils by providing them with
both conservation and allocation powers. 246 For sustainable de-
velopment to occur, these two responsibilities cannot lie within
the same body.247 The Enhancement Act proposes to grant fish-
ery and marine science subcommittees power to establish man-
agement guidelines. 24 8 The proposal, however, does not call for
tect fish and wildlife." Id. at 113. There are already several ocean and coastal
oriented agencies under the DOI's authority. Id. Another logical option is to
house NOAA and other similarly tasked agencies in a new department. Past
restructuring attempts suggested that the Department of Natural Resources
could oversee such conservation activities. Id. at 109.
243. See Heneman, supra note 182, at 1.
244. Id.
245. See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE PUB. SERV., URGENT BUSINESS FOR
AMERICA 14 (2003), available at http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/gs/
cps/volcker/reportfinal.pdf. The breadth of agencies involved in fisheries man-
agement, and much environmental regulation in the United States, undercuts
efficiency. See id. at 15; U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 185, at
112. Consolidation of ocean and coastal management agencies would also fa-
cilitate and enable ecosystem management, an approach vital to achieving
sustainable development of marine fisheries. See id. at 110.
246. See EAGLE ETAL., supra note 2, at 5.
247. See id. at 37; U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 185, at 277-
78.
248. Fisheries Science and Management Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R.
1431, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
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binding scientific decisions, but rather for recommendations to
the councils. 249
To best achieve sustainable development, conservation and
allocation decision making must be delegated to separate and
distinct bodies. 250 Current regulations allow for scientific and
statistical committees to advise the councils, but their recom-
mendations are nonbinding.251 Fisheries management legisla-
tion should create a science-based conservation body and a
separate allocative body of equal authority.
As Congress articulates a new framework for administer-
ing conservation and allocation decisions, it should also address
the composition of those bodies. Ideally, legislation would man-
date a balance of fisheries stakeholders on each body. The pro-
posed Enhancement Act 252 wisely begins to address a balance of
interests. In continuing with this theme, federal law should
mandate that a scientific body be staffed with those educated
and able to understand the science-based nature of conserva-
tion decisions. However, economists, the fishing industry, fish-
ermen, the public, and other relevant stakeholders should also
be represented.
To maintain a science-based decision-making process,
those with any financial interest in any fishing industry com-
ponent (whether directly related to the decision in front of the
body or not) must not participate in any vote or discussion to
best limit bias in the conservation decision-making process.253
New fisheries legislation should likewise mandate, rather than
suggest and facilitate, balanced representation of competing in-
terests on the allocative body as well. The same recusal man-
249. See id.
250. See EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 38. The benefits of separating allo-
cation and conservation decisions is noted by the International Commission
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). See Peel et al., supra note
109, at 575-76. Historically, the Standing Committee on Research and Statis-
tics made the scientific decisions for ICCAT. See id. at 577. Policy and how to
use that science is a discussion left to member-nation delegates at ICCAT an-
nual meetings. See id.
251. See EAGLE ETAL., supra note 2, at 16.
252. H.R. 1431.
253. Fisheries legislation should strive to include all relevant competing
interests involved in the decision-making process. It is essential, however that
the fundamental basis for management decisions be based on strong science-
based information. That is why this Note suggests that industry participants
be included on any council-type body to facilitate meaningful discussion incor-
porating all issues. However, the inherent bias of industry must be curbed
with a stricter recusal platform.
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dates 254 and discussion-limiting2 55 regulation applicable to the
scientific body would bind members of the allocative body.
In addition to creating coequal conservation and allocation
decision-making bodies, fisheries management legislation
should abolish the eight council system. The FCMA is the only
resource management law that places a layer of bureaucracy
between state and federal authorities. 256 Because fish are in-
herently mobile species, as is particularly the case with large
marine fish stocks, cross-jurisdictional management is necessi-
tated under current regulations. Though joint planning is ad-
dressed under FCMA rules and regulations, joint planning has
proven ineffective. 257
In light of past cross-jurisdictional failures, along with the
many faults of the council system that remain uncured, the
eight councils should be reduced to two: an East Coast and a
West Coast council. Both a conservation and an allocation
"council" would function at these large-scale levels. Each coun-
cil should operate at a federal level with state participation to
ensure decisions with local and regional implications are based
on accurate and appropriate factors.258 This would allow for
better management of fish stocks that currently lie in more
than one regional council's jurisdiction. Additionally, large-
scale management would facilitate sustainable development of
economically important and highly migratory species. 259
254. The Reform Act proposed this amendment to the FCMA, see Fisheries
Management Reform Act of 2004, H.R. 4706, 108th Cong. § 4 (2004), which
currently allows council members to vote unless they have a greater than 10%
financial interest in a fishery. 50 C.F.R. § 600.235(c) (2004). The Enhancement
Act, however, does not include such language. See H.R. 1431.
255. The proposed Reform Act appropriately took this step with regards to
the current council system. See H.R. 4706. Again, such a provision is notably
absent from the Enhancement Act. See H.R. 1431.
256. Magnuson, supra note 15, at 436; Young, supra note 7, at 215; see also
Pontecorvo, supra note 168, at 654 (explaining that "there is a substantial dif-
ference between allowing local or regional bodies to make decisions about local
services and allowing such bodies to make decisions affecting production for
national-and international markets").
257. U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 185, at 242.
258. The structure of a new marine fisheries regulatory framework could
mimic the Fish and Wildlife Service, which takes advantage of localized exper-
tise and uses national administrative resources. See Sharon R. Siegel, Note,
Applying the Habitat Conservation Model to Fisheries Management: A Pro-
posal for a Modified Fisheries Planning Requirement, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
141,207-08 (2000).
259. See PEW OCEANS COMM'N, supra note 84, at 40.
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C. FISHERIES MANAGEMENT SHOULD PROCEED UNDER AN
ECOSYSTEM APPROACH, Focus ON FISHING EFFORT, AND
MANDATE TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Management under new legislation must take an ecosys-
tem approach. 260 The proposed Enhancement Act begins to
promote ecosystem management. 261 By suggesting that the
aforementioned regional science and technical teams "consider
predator-prey relationships and other ecological factors," the
amendment suggests that more than a single target species be
considered when drafting management plans.262 More can be
done, however, and California's Marine Life Management Act,
encouraging and reinforcing an ecosystem-based approach with
its explicit policies, serves as a beginning template for a legal
framework to support ecosystem management. 263 Under such a
management approach, regulation must focus neither on a
maximum sustainable yield, as most fisheries management
does, 264 nor on the optimum yield mandated by the FCMA.
265
Rather it should appropriately attempt to rebuild healthy eco-
systems, of which fish stocks are only one factor.266
Coupled with an ecosystem-based approach, regulations
should focus on fishing effort. Currently, regulation focuses on
limiting indirect impacts on fish stocks such as boat size, equip-
ment, and fishing seasons.267 These regulations limit the num-
ber of fishers participating in the industry, but do not control
intensity or amount of fishing effort. Any new regulation
should instead focus on directly controlling catch levels,
268
which would cause government regulation to focus on altering
260. The Reform Act mandates this approach, which is clearly necessary
from a scientific standpoint. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text
(making the argument for ecosystem management).
261. Fisheries Science and Management Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R.
41431, 109th Cong. § 6 (2005).
262. Id. § 5(c)(i).
263. See Heneman, supra note 182, at 3-4.
264. See Pitcher & Pauly, supra note 12, at 312.
265. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(5) (2000).
266. See Pitcher & Pauly, supra note 12, at 313. Restructuring of the ad-
ministrative framework under which fisheries legislation is executed would
contribute to a productive ecosystem-based management approach. U.S.
COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 185, at 74-75.
267. See Adler, supra note 21, at 16-17.
268. See id. at 14.
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the open-access nature of fisheries, 269 thereby greatly increas-
ing the likelihood of sustainable development for fish stocks.
Effective environmental management demands timely and
accessible scientific information.270 To facilitate administration
of ecosystem management, comprehensive legislation should
mandate the collection of scientific data needed to appropri-
ately manage marine fisheries. In the absence of complete sci-
entific data, biologists agree that a precautionary approach,
dictating low harvest levels, is best.271 Importantly, large popu-
lations, such as highly migratory species and straddling
stocks, 272 may collapse quickly once depleted below a certain
level. This characteristic makes a precautionary approach vital
in the absence of complete data. 273 Laws regulating manage-
ment strategies should mandate the use of the best scientific
information, with a precautionary approach used in the ab-
sence of complete data.2 7 4 While the FCMA dictates use of the
best scientific information available, new legislation should ad-
ditionally require that such information be sought out and
269. See id. at 16.
270. See COMM. ON FISHERIES ET AL., IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT OF
U.S. MARINE FISHERIES 5-6 (1994), available at http://www.nap.edulbooksl
NXO04009html/index.html (describing the importance of using the "best sci-
entific information available" to formulate management plans); Marcos A.
Orellana, The Law on Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: ITLOS Jurisprudence in
Context, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 459, 469 (2004).
271. See Mahon & Oxenford, supra note 111, at 436. See generally Ellen K.
Pikitch, The Scientific Case for Precautionary Management: Current Fishery
Problems Traced to Improper Use of Science, in MANAGING MARINE FISHERIES
IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 160, at 59 (citing examples where scientific
uncertainty should have militated for a precautionary approach).
272. The term straddling stocks defines species that lie partially within a
nation's territorial waters and partially within the high seas. See Stuart Kaye,
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Convention, 70 AUSTL. L.J. 533,
534 (1996); see also supra note 146 (defining highly migratory species).
273. See A.W. SCHORGER, THE PASSENGER PIGEON: ITS NATURAL HISTORY
AND EXTINCTION 215 (1955). A precautionary approach may well mandate
time and closures of fishing areas to any and all fishing activity. See Peel et
al., supra note 109, at 583.
274. In addition to a need for scientific information within the fishing in-
dustry, there is a need for greater dissemination of such information to indi-
vidual consumers. For example, tools such as the Monterey Bay Aquarium's
seafood watch pocket guide urging consumers to "[u]se this [g]uide to [miake
[c]hoices for [h]ealthy [o]ceans" should be promoted. MONTEREY BAY
AQUARIUM, SEAFOOD WATCH: NATIONAL SEAFOOD GUIDE, at http://www.
mbayaq.org/cr/cr-seafoodwatchlcontent/media/seafoodwatchnational.pdf.
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compiled in a timely fashion to ensure informed and appropri-
ate management strategies are used.
275
D. LEGISLATION MUST ADDRESS STRONG SANCTIONS AND
EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
None of the above suggestions will result in sustainable
development of marine fisheries without effective enforcement
of meaningful sanctions. The FCMA provides for civil and
criminal penalties for violations.276 However, neither the FCMA
nor the proposed Enhancement Act articulate specific sanctions
for particular violations of substantive conservation provisions.
To be effective, new legislation should set forth particular civil
and criminal prohibitions.
Fisheries problems involve human judgment and are there-
fore inherently social problems,2 7 7 a notion that must be re-
membered while drafting management legislation. People often
will not change their behavior until there are sanctions in place
strong enough to induce them to do so.278 Sanctions for viola-
tions of fisheries law must be set at levels that become mean-
ingful to industry participants, driving their compliance with
laws. This demands strictly enforced civil sanctions that repre-
sent financial penalties significant enough to impact behavior.
Criminal sanctions, with their higher burden of proof, can be
used as an additional deterrent for particularly egregious or
repetitive violations.
Commentators agree that enforcement of management
plans is a key component to achieving sustainable development
of fisheries. 279 Fishermen evade monitoring authorities, provide
incomplete reports, and falsify catch data outright, leading to
enforcement difficulties. 28 0 To combat such activities, more op-
portunities for cooperation between federal and state enforce-
275. See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) (2000).
276. Id. §§ 1859-1860.
277. See Marc L. Miller, Utilization of Social Science in Federal Manage-
ment of U.S. Marine Fisheries: Strong Commitment to Research Will Improve
Management Outcomes, in MANAGING MARINE FISHERIES IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 160, at 45, 45.
278. See Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility,
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 364 (2004).
279. See, e.g., Rebecca Bratspies, Finessing King Neptune: Fisheries Man-
agement and the Limits of International Law, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 213,
258 (2001) (stating that "the core problem of fisheries management" is "the
lack of enforcement authority on the high seas").
280. See Carr & Scheiber, supra note 5, at 61-62.
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ment agencies must be promoted. 28 1 Ideally, fisheries manage-
ment legislation would provide a dedicated enforcement body.
Realistically, any agency tasked with implementing federal
fisheries management must make use of relationships between
federal and state authorities to maximize enforcement efforts.
To facilitate enforcement, specific regulations should man-
date that all fishing vessels carry vessel monitoring systems
(VMS). VMS are satellite-based systems that use GPS technol-
ogy to communicate accurate, real-time locations of vessels. 28 2
Some management councils already require certain vessels to
carry such systems. 283 Notably, the use of VMS represents
large financial savings for enforcement programs, enabling
more efficient expenditure of resources. 28 4 The Code of Federal
Regulations codifies current radio requirements and recom-
mendations for fishing vessels, suggesting similar regulations
can, and should, be promulgated regarding VMS.285
The FCMA has been amended many times. 28 6 The recently
proposed Enhancement Act focuses on conservation aspects of
the Act.28 7 At its heart, however, the FCMA is protectionist leg-
islation aimed at eliminating foreign economic competition in
U.S. fisheries. 28 8 The relationship between complex ecosystems
and regulatory approaches and institutions continues to de-
velop28 9 as the connection between economic development in-
terests and healthy ecosystems is recognized. 290 Fisheries man-
281. See U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 185, at 249-50 (find-
ing that coordinated efforts between the Coast Guard and state authorities is
a successful approach to enforcement).
282. Christopher J. Carr, Vessel Monitoring Systems: A New Technology for
the Transition to Sustainable Fisheries, in EMERGING ISSUES IN NATIONAL
OCEAN AND COASTAL POLICY 31, 31 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1999). The system
consists of a transceiver placed on the vessel that forwards data to a land
earth station, which in turn forwards information to a base station. Id.
Through this route, the base station is able to monitor the vessel's position
and movement over time. Id.
283. Id. at 31-32.
284. Recent Coast Guard projections estimated an annual cost of almost
$23 million to achieve the same coverage of enforcement by agencies operating
vessel monitoring systems at a cost of $250,000. Id. at 32.
285. 50 C.F.R. §§ 600.504(b), .730 (2004).
286. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at iv.
287. See Fisheries Management Reform Act of 2004, H.R. 4706, 108th
Cong. (2004).
288. See EAGLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 3.
289. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Transboundary Ecosystem Governance:
Beyond Sovereignty?, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10094, 10099 (2005).
290. See James M. McElfish Jr., Drafting Nature-Friendly Ordinances: An
1912 [89:1876
CRISIS AT SEA
agement laws must come from legislation with a singular con-
servation-oriented purpose to be effective in the face of such
evolving discoveries and realizations.
Marine fisheries law must take into account the numerous
competing interests that hold a stake in maintaining healthy
U.S. fisheries. To ensure these public resources are consistently
managed with all stakeholder interests in mind, new legisla-
tion would wisely contain a congressional reporting require-
ment.291 While inherently a policy goal, the aforementioned
mindsets can be embodied in fisheries law, bringing about a
much needed paradigm shift in how these important resources
are managed. In the end, "issues of legal theory and political
theory are inextricably intertwined" and must come together if
sustainable development of fisheries is indeed a goal our nation
wishes to pursue. 292
CONCLUSION
In 1971, scholars William Hale and Dag Wittusen wrote
that "one must not underestimate the seriousness of fishery
problems." 293 It seems, unfortunately, that we have done just
that as it is now clear that overfishing is quickly becoming a
tragedy of the commons. Nationally and globally, overfishing
continues to decimate fish stocks with no foreseeable end in
sight.
Because fisheries are open-access natural resources, they
are susceptible to befalling the tragedy of the commons in the
absence of either privatization or government regulation. In the
face of unproven economics, difficulty in attaining sustainable
development, political opposition, and high social costs, privati-
Ecological Checklist, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10100, 10100 (2005).
291. See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE PUB. SERV., supra note 245, at 17 (explain-
ing that "[o]perating agencies desperately need the support of an active Con-
gress," and "broad grants of administrative flexibility demand effective con-
gressional oversight, transparency, and clear reporting relationships"). In
addition to promoting communication and oversight, a congressional reporting
requirement makes fisheries management the purview of the public to whom
these resources belong. When this important stakeholder finds that manage-
ment techniques are not appropriate, the ultimate oversight of voter account-
ability can function as it is intended.
292. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 81 (2001).
293. WILLIAM E. HALE & DAG FASMER WITTUSEN, WORLD FISHERIES: A
'TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS"? 59 (197 1).
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zation will not result in effective management of marine fisher-
ies.
Sustainable development of marine fisheries necessitates
pursuit of government regulation. The United States' current
regulatory framework, though successful in some cases, has
proven largely ineffective in establishing sustainable fish
stocks. The Enhancement Act would change that framework to
better promote sustainability in our marine fisheries resources.
The proposed amendments, however, will not sufficiently
change the management paradigm of the FCMA to achieve sus-
tainable development.
Professor Daniel Farber characterized environmental regu-
lation as an "enterprise that challenges lawmakers' ability 'to
keep up with rapid change."' 294 This Note challenges lawmak-
ers to provide a legal framework that "keeps up with change"
and allows government regulation to achieve sustainable devel-
opment of fish stocks. Such legislation must focus on conserva-
tion as a sole purpose, revise the administrative framework of
regulation, separate conservation and allocation decision-
making power, mandate an ecosystem approach and the pur-
suit of sound science, and create meaningful sanctions that are
strictly enforced.
Thinking about fisheries conservation in terms of tomorrow
must become thinking about conservation of these resources
decades from now. Protecting our marine resources is possible.
A notable example is international whaling, where it took al-
most three decades to reach agreement over management of
whale populations. 295 The result of this three-decade delay is
that while whale populations have rebounded, U.S. industry no
longer harvests this marine resource. Congress can, and must,
be farsighted and quick acting in regulating marine fisheries as
a resource before the same fate befalls another industry.
Reinvention of marine fisheries management is needed to
stave off a tragedy in our fisheries resources, and a legal
mechanism will have to ensure that reinvention takes place.
"Ours, after all, is a legal culture ... ,"296 While using the law
294. Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of In-
formation Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 495, 499 (2004) (citing DANIEL A. FARBER,
Eco-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD 194 (1999)).
295. See JOHN VOGLER, THE GLOBAL COMMONS 53-58 (1995).
296. Jim Chen, Across the Apocalypse on Horseback: Imperfect Legal Re-
sponses to Biodiversity Loss, in THE JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
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to prevent environmental disasters has not been greatly suc-
cessful in the past,297 perhaps the fear of a potential tragedy
will prove motivating. As novelist Octavia Butler stated, "I'm
hopeful .... [W]e tend to do the right things when we get
scared."298
PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
197, 205 (Jim Chen ed., 2003).
297. See, e.g., id. passim.
298. 'We Tend to Do the Right Thing When We Get Scared,' N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2000, at E21, quoted in JOSEPH F.C. DIMENTO, THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAw, at vi (2003).
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